After the various events on October 4th, the situation in Georgia remains inconclusive, with varying assessments, including on who won and in which respect.
The legitimacy of the Georgian Dream is further weakened by a poor showing in municipal elections in Tbilisi for what they themselves billed as a referendum on their governance. Only about 20% of voters in Tbilisi came to support the party, which is close to rock-bottom for a regime that has 15% of the electorate locked in as government employees & their families that rightly regard voting for the ruling party to be a precondition for keeping their job. Within that, Georgian Dream went all out. Many millions were spent, and the campaign was largely framed as endorsing the Georgian Dream overall, with national slogans rather than local issues. (Final figures likely are inflated, as some forms of cheating will have gone unchecked, with no meaningful local or international observation.)
The opposition spectrum also stands weakened in some regards. Part of the opposition spectrum is now associated with pronouncing an actual seizure of power and the attempt to seize a building, which is now used to pursue criminal charges. Expectations of an operatic spectacle were broadly fulfilled but did not translate into the political miracle that many had been hoping for. The spectrum is also weakened in people questioning the capacity of opposition parties to have a strategy — for themselves, for the political situation, and for the country overall.
In the meantime, Georgian Dream will amp up its repressions, with more people targeted for criminal investigation. It seems set to pursue the prohibition of opposition parties. Prohibitions will probably focus on UNM and Coalition for Change, likely exempting Lelo to further set the opposition spectrum against each other. (The prohibition of For Georgia / Gakharia may go either way. On the one hand, Mr. Gakharia apparently believes that he is a prime target for the vendetta of Bidzina Ivanishvili; on the other, the former Prime Minister also believes that one needs to use the little available political space, which may be welcomed by the Georgian Dream.)
The opposition spectrum right now is busy with dissections of October 4th, with recriminations flowing in various directions. Was it right to boycott? Could the elections have been won? Should anyone have invested hope into October 4th? Did opposition leaders keep too much or too little distance? How many more days on Rustaveli will be needed? One recrimination is followed by another in a predictable choreography. It is practically impossible to exit these conversations once you begin them. (Much has been written about the flow of misinformation on social networks. Perhaps the rocket fuel of recriminations has done even more to hollow out the political center across various countries.)
On the plus side for democracy in Georgia, the mass turnout showed that months of repression have not resulted in people giving up; some groups remain extraordinarily courageous in the face of direct threat by the state, as in the women who challenged riot police on Leonidze in the early evening. It was, as I said elsewhere, a show of strength but not of direction.
Internationally, the situation came out in a mix. The most important point has been conveyed by people who are widely read: the Georgian people are still standing up. At the same time, the attempted storming of the presidential residency feeds the narrative of intemperate radical groups and the recriminations add to the sense that it remains difficult for outside capitals to identify key interlocutors in the opposition parties that they can talk to.
“Что делать?” — What Next?
For the opposition spectrum — encompassing a wide range of opposition parties and various forms of civil society — there arguably are the following priorities.
Winning the narrative battle for an inspiring-yet-plausible & authentic interpretation of what happened on October 4th. This framing needs to inspire people to come together and focus on what’s next, without coming across as sugarcoating or naive. A compelling account has bridge divisions rather than sharpening them, and be emotionally reassuring. It needs to be savvy, in positioning oneself. For political leaders, or those aspiring to be one, there is not any need to review all that was done or not done. [“For detailed analysis, we are blessed with many great voices representing diverse views such as [mention names].”]
Within all this, opposition leaders should stop assessing what other opposition parties are doing, and focus what they themselves are already doing to get the country back on track. Projecting leadership is far more important than providing commentary. Also, continue to remind people how this is not a normal country and how many problems remain unaddressed. Nudging friends and partners to have constructive conversations, not go into loops, is also a valuable contribution.
Obviously there is an impasse, so the opposition spectrum needs to regroup to articulate a plausible strategy for themselves and for any partners. For many, it means putting their own house in order, after being reactive for most of the previous months. It will be key to bring a functional focus to the tasks at hand. That is less ambitious than some other versions (cabinet-in-waiting, see the great piece by Sergi Kapanadze) and perhaps therefore more immediately achievable. It is necessary.
Overall, there is a need to switch to a smart strategy of making the most of what one has rather than doing the Godot-thing: awaiting arrivals that may or will not happen, in the form of some shock that will greatly impact the regime. If citing Lenin’s Что делать? triggers some, it also conveys that opposition spectrum should look to other cases where people worked for transformative change under nigh-impossible circumstances, even among figures they might not at first like.
There are a lot of lessons out there. One of them could be focusing on weekly protests, rather than daily, such as the Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig in the late 1980s — also against a deeply repressive regime. Do the math: multiply the number of people on Rustaveli with the three hours they will spend, on average, on a night to get there, be there, get back. If you assume there are typically a bit more than 300 people there (a low estimate), we are at about a thousand hours per day. In my view, these hours could be invested in doing work that is more likely to bring change.
Whatever one does should be integrated into a broader plausible strategy. I have heard some sensible ideas out there but that is for another time.
In the end, it comes back to this. The dominance of the Georgian Dream across institutions conceals that they are not that strong. Across the world, those that today are described as postliberal populists have real grievances that they run on, ranging from immigration to historical humiliation (Trianon, Sèvres, “regional power”, and so forth). The Georgian Dream? It has to make up entirely imaginary enemies.
The Georgian Dream has no compelling vision; they commit one injustice after another; the party is deeply demoralized; they struggle to govern; while spending millions on their campaign, there was no energy; Kakha Kaladze (don’t yell at me, please) actually is a decently competent mayor (yes, I know about how cronies get building permits), and still — they have an incredibly limp result.
In that way, October 4 can be seen as a referendum on the ability to put the country back on track. The Georgian Dream lost it. The one big question is: who will get their act together to eventually win against the regime?
